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COMMENT
ON THE SUBJECT OF PROPERTY AND SOCIAL SECURITY:
A TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS'
Rick J. Hecker"
"Man can live and satisfy his wants only by ceaseless labor; by the
ceaseless application of his faculties to natural resources. This
process is the origin of property."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in Genesis, the first book of the Bible, after mankind was given
common dominion over the entire world,2 private property developed
through the exertion of an individual's time or talents on an object.
William Blackstone, John Locke, Frederick Bastiat, and many others share
the same conviction on the origins of property.' Through the exertion of
energy, an individual can gain dominion over the object of his efforts and
thereby gain a defensible right in the object. The common law has long
accepted the concept of dominion as the basis of a defensible right in an

t A special thanks to my Managing Editor, Daniel J. Schmid, for the title. His
assurances that nothing titled "On the Subject of' would ever be dull led to the selection of
this title.
tt Symposium Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2013); B.A., History, Hillsdale College (2010). I would like
to thank my wife, Catherine R. Hecker, for her help editing and developing this Comment
and especially for her love, support, and encouragement throughout the writing of this
Comment. Further, I would like to thank my parents, John P. Jr. and Janine L. Hecker, for
their support of my endeavors. Additionally, I would like to thank the LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW for all the time and effort spent in editing this Comment and providing
valuable suggestions.
1. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 10 (Dean Russell trans., Found. for Econ. Liberty, Inc.
1950) (1850). "But it is also true that a man may live and satisfy his wants by seizing and
consuming the products of the labor of others. This process is the origins of plunder." Id.
2. Genesis 1:26 (King James) (all subsequent citations to Scripture are from the same
version).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
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object.' In principle, the defense of property is equivalent to the defense of
individual industry and to the rewards that flow therefrom.'
Under a traditional theory of property, a laborer has the right to reap the
rewards of his investments. For example, when an individual agrees to
invest capital in a new business, the law accords that individual a right to
receive the benefits that flow from that investment.' Equally, an individual
could share in the losses of that investment if it were to fail. Likewise, if a
laborer were to place his earnings into an individual retirement account or a
company-organized pension plan, then the law would accord him any
accrued benefits consistent with the agreement.' These examples, however,
stand in stark contrast to the benefits paid out in Social Security. Most
5. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing the principles of
dominion and possession).
6. Andrew Carnegie saw the institution of property as the key of civilization precisely
because it protected an individual's industry.
Objections to the foundations upon which society is based are not in order,
because the condition of the race is better with these than it has been with any
other which has been tried. Of the effect of any new substitutes proposed we
cannot be sure. The Socialist or Anarchist who seeks to overturn present
conditions is to be regarded as attacking the foundation upon which civilization
itself rests, for civilization took its start from the day when the capable,
industrious workman said to his incompetent and lazy fellow, "If thou dost not
sow, thou shalt not reap," and thus ended primitive Communism by separating
the drones from the bees. One who studies this subject will soon be brought
face to face with the conclusion that upon the sacredness of property
civilization itself depends-the right of the laborer to his hundred dollars in the
savings-bank, and equally the legal right of the millionaire to his millions.
ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 9-10 (Applewood Books 1998) (1889).
7. Galatians6:7 ("Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man sows, this
he will also reap.").
8. This is a fundamental concept of contract law-a principle upon which many suits
have been brought. See, e.g., Capitol Specialty Ins. v. Indus. Elecs., LLC, 407 F. App'x 47, 52
(6th Cir. 2011) (claiming that breach of contract did not exclude insurance coverage under
plaintiffs policy); Resco, Inc. v. Founders Title Grp., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1442, 1445-46 (D.
Haw. 1990) (claiming breach of option contract); Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes,
Inc., 336 S.E.2d 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (claiming breach of contract); Smith v. Harriman
Util. Bd., 26 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (claiming owed benefits under
agreement).
9. This concept, too, is a fundamental principle of contract law, one about which
numerous statutes have been written. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 408 (2012) (defining individual
retirement accounts); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2449 (2011) (providing for the payment of
Individual Retirement Accounts upon death); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 8569 (2010)
(providing rules for governing individual retirement accounts).
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cannot agree on how the law ought to treat benefit payments.'o Even the
Supreme Court of the United States seems unable to consistently classify
Social Security benefits."
The ambiguity began with the creation of a welfare program infused with
a hint of personal investment. Social Security was enacted by Congress in
1935.12 Congress's goal was to alleviate the uncertainty that the elderly
experienced with the loss of their retirement investments in the Great
Depression of the 1930s.13 While functioning like welfare, the program was
designed to appear more like an individual retirement account, thus
reducing the embarrassment individuals might feel in receiving federal
assistance during their old age." This ploy worked well-even Congress
began to refer to Social Security as an earned benefit, distinct from welfare
benefits like food stamps." Naturally, Social Security benefits appeared to
be a dividend paid upon an investment.' Social Security, however, actually
consists of a designated tax, which provides for a specific welfare program."
10. There is a multiplicity of law review articles contending for differing levels of welfare
recipient rights. See, e.g., Ruth Ben-Israel, Social Security in the Year 2000: Potentialitiesand
Problems, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 139, 142 (1995) (referring to social security as a socioeconomic
human right); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1985) (addressing two separate eras of welfare entitlement jurisprudence); John
McGuire, The Public Debt Clause and the Social Security Trust Funds: Enforcement
Mechanism or HistoricalPeculiarity,7 Loy. J.PUB. INT. L. 203, 216 (2006) (contending that
the courts have not fully explored the possibility of contractual rights in Social Security
benefits).
11. See infra Part II.C.2.
12. CHARLES MCKINLEY & ROBERT W. FRASE, LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURITY 3 (1970).
13. See id. at 7-10.
14. LARRY W. DEWITT ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 55 (2008)
(stating that the withholdings helped create a "self-respecting method through which
workers make their own provision for old age").
15. McKINLEY & FRASE, supra note 12, at 308 & n.1 (noting that Congress changed the
Social Security Act's language from "old age benefits" to "federal old age and survivor's
insurance" in 1939). Thus, Congress was denoting that they believed Social Security to be
more of an annuity or whole life insurance plan. See 3A HORNER PROBATE PRAC. & ESTATES
§ 66.1 (Michael P. McElroy, 2011) (defining annuity as "a fixed sum, payable periodically,
subject to such limitations as the grantor may impose. . . . The determining characteristic of
an annuity is that the annuitant has an interest only in the payments and not in the principle
fund from which the payments are made."); see also Steve Kurylo, Choosing the Most
Appropriate Insurance Policy and Company, 23 EST. PLAN. 366, 367 (1996) (defining whole
life insurance).
16. McKINLEY &FRASE, supra note 12, at 308 &n.1.
17. WALLACE C. PETERSON, THE SOCIAL SECURITY PRIMER 54 (1999).
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This Comment seeks to address the ambiguity that has developed in the
law regarding Social Security benefit payments. Section II of this Comment
addresses the nature of property to provide a background from which to
analyze Social Security benefits. Section III examines how the Supreme
Court has handled Social Security benefits and then offers a traditional
analysis by which to classify them. Section IV of this Comment contends
that in abandoning traditional notions of property, the Court has created
confusion in the legislature, which in part impacts its ability to deal with the
current budget deficit.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Origins of Property
William Blackstone stated, "There is nothing which so generally strikes
the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of
property."" Few, however, can articulate the origins of their property
rights." In considering the origins of property, one might remember The
Sound of Music and take Maria's advice: "Let's start at the very beginning, a
very good place to start."20
1. John Locke
Genesis, the first book of Moses, contains an accurate description of the
origins of property and was the starting place for both John Locke and

The truly fundamental way in which Social Security differs from private
pensions is in being an income transfer system, organized and administered by
the federal government. What the government does is tax one segment of the
population and quite literally transferthe money collected to another segment
of the population. This is the bedrock essence of Social Security. The segment
of the population being taxed is persons at work, and the segment of the
population receiving this money includes persons over 65, disabled, and
survivors of workers. . . . Further, and unlike private pension systems, the
transfer income (i.e., benefits) paid to the system's beneficiaries are not
determined by what a worker has paid into the system in taxes over his or her
working life, but by a government formula-called the "benefit formula"which is based on the worker's lifetime earnings.
Id.
18. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.

19. Id.
20. THE SOUND OF MUSIC (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 1965).
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William Blackstone.2 1 In Genesis, man was given "dominion over the fish of
the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."2 2 This
verse establishes man's common dominion over the things of the world.2 3
Locke contends that in the beginning man possessed only those rights that
were inalienable to his person." By investment of those inalienable rights in
the form of labor, man could gain property. 25 Fruits could be claimed
through gathering, and land could be claimed through improvement.2 6
Property could be accumulated as needed or abandoned as its utility
property
Further, currency augmented
became extinguished.27
accumulation by allowing the free trade of low-utility items to a buyer who
would pay in gold or silver, which could be accumulated and saved.2 8
2.

William Blackstone

Blackstone gave a nearly identical account of the formation of property
rights, but nevertheless admitted that there is some disagreement among
natural law theorists regarding the manner by which property rights vest.
For Blackstone, the important distinction was that the thing possessed
becomes the property of the possessor upon possession." Blackstone
understood this newly-created right of property as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the

21. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303-04 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
2005) (1690); see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *2-3.
22.

Genesis 1:26.

23. LOCKE, supra note 21, at 304.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 304-06.

26. Id. at 306-09. Scripture further supports this principle when Abraham confronts
Abimelech about the well Abraham had dug and which Abimelech had "violently taken
away." Genesis 21:25-32.
27. LOCKE, supra note 21, at 317.

28. Id. at 318-20.
29. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *8. Modern theorists on the origins of property law
have adopted a wide variety of rationales for the existence of property rights. Some of these
theories will be covered later in this section. See generally PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND
CRITICAL POSITIONS (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1999) (1978) (containing a collection of varying
views on property rights and origins).
30. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *8-9.
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universe."" While some may scoff at this assertion given today's complexity
of social relationships,3 2 even Blackstone admitted that this dominion is
tempered by "the law of the land."33 Regardless of this critique, under this
theory, a working thesis contends that property is the use of labor to possess
a thing, tangible or intangible, and labor establishes an alienable right in the
thing possessed.
This concept of possession is taught to first-year law students through
examining the classic case of Pierson v. Post.34 In that case, Justice Tompkins
explored a question of when the pursuit of a wild fox establishes possession
sufficient to create a property right and thereby excludes all others from
possession." Post was in the midst of pursuing a fox when Pierson
intervened and killed the fox, in spite of hearing the bark of the pursuing
hounds.36 Upon these simple facts, the court determined that Post had not
deprived the fox of its natural liberty and therefore had not established
possession, despite being in pursuit." This case demonstrates that
possession or occupancy is an important element of property law."
3. Relational Property
Disregarding the well-articulated descriptions of the origins of property
given by John Locke and William Blackstone, there has been a plethora of
further speculations on the origins of property." For example, some authors
have suggested that property is best described as a relationship between
persons and the object.40 These arguments stem from Roman jurisprudence
and feudal influences on modern property law." This argument claims that
"[w]hatever technical definition of property we may prefer, we must
31. Id. at *2.
32. C. REINOLD NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY 297 (1936).
33. 1 BLACKSTONE,supra note 18, at *138.
34. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).

35. Id. at 177.
36. Id. at 175.
37. Id. at 179-80.
38. JAMES L. WINOKUR, R. WILSON FREYERMUTH & JEROME M. ORGAN, PROPERTY AND
LAWYERING 67 (2002). Coinciding with the concept of "possession" is the concept of "firstin-time," which distinguishes between theft and lawful possession. Id. at 121; see also
Armory v. Delamirie, (1795) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); 1 Str. 505.
39. See generally PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONs, supra note 29.
40. See NOYEs, supra note 32, at 356-57; see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELLL. Q. 8, 11-12 (1927).
41. NOYEs,supra note 32, at 285.
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recognize that a property right is a relation not between an owner and a
thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference to things."4
Thus, by protecting the property right of the landlord, the law gives a form
of sovereignty to the landlord over the renter." Indeed, even the clothes one
wears are subject to the "lines decreed by their manufacturers."" Therefore,
because property is sovereignty, "it is necessary to apply to the law of
property all those considerations of social ethics and enlightened public
policy."45 in essence, relational property allows for government restraint of
private property's power for the perceived common good of the people.4
4. Pre-1935 American Property Law
The differences between Blackstone's view of property and his critics'
views have caused some confusion for courts. Some courts have defined
property as "any object of value that a person may lawfully acquire and
hold, or any valuable interest therein or thereto,"4 which fits closely to
Blackstone's understanding. Others have adopted a more relational view of
property:
The term property may be defined to be the interest which can
be acquired in external objects or things. The things themselves
are not, in a true sense, property, but they constitute its
foundation and material, and the idea of property springs out of
the connection, or control, or interest which, according to law,
may be acquired in them, or over them.
Still others have mixed the two ideas by stating that property "means not
only the thing owned, but also every right which accompanies ownership
and is its incident." 49
Prior to 1935, certain limited interests were regularly considered to be
property. 0 For example, in Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Ravalli

42. Cohen, supra note 40, at 12.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 14.
46. See PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS, supra note 29, at 153.
47. State v. Frusha, 91 So. 430, 431 (La. 1922).
48. Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co., 23 S.C. 25, 38 (1885).
49. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467, 469 (1885).
50. NOYEs, supra note 32, at 378 (noting "[t]he extent to which American courts have
gone in expanding the concept of property to include practically all rights, however
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County,5 1 the court treated "the minerals and the right to mine the same;
also a right of way over the land" as property for the purposes of taxation.52
Courts further held that "the right to fish is a property right and not a mere
privilege."5 3 Yet, American courts were unwilling to include driver licenses
as property. "[A] license to operate a motor vehicle is a permit to do that
which would otherwise be unlawful. Although the privilege may be
valuable, it is not property in any legal sense or constitutional sense."5
Likewise, even a business license could be revoked despite a seemingly
arbitrary revocation." Additionally, the revocation of a license was not a
deprivation of property. In Commonwealth v. Kingsley,56 the court stated,
"A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the legislature sees
fit to impose .... Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does
not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity or privilege ....
Some Courts would not even consider a corporate franchise property of the
franchisee."
The Supreme Court in Lynch v. United States"9 stated that government
compensation was not a right of any kind. 60 "Pensions, compensation
attenuated, which immediately or ultimately concern relations with respect to specific
material objects can well be demonstrated").
51. Anaconda Copper Mining v. Ravalli Cnty., 158 P. 682 (Mont. 1916).
52. Id. at 683.
53. Leong Mow v. Bd. of Comm'rs for Prot. of Birds, Game, & Fish, 185 F. 223
(C.C.E.D. La. 1911); see also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1876).
54. La Plante v. State Bd. of Pub. Rds., 131 A. 641, 642-43 (R.I. 1926).
A license being "neither a contract nor a right of property within the legal and
constitutional meaning of those terms," is no more than "a temporary permit to
do that which would otherwise be unlawful, hence, the authority, which
granted a license always retains the power to revoke it, either for due cause of
forfeiture, or upon a change of policy and legislation" in regard to the subject.
And such revocation cannot be pronounced unconstitutional, either as an
impairment of contract obligations, or as unlawfully divesting persons of their
property rights.
Id. (citing CHARLES

J. BABBITT, THE LAW APPLIED TO MOTOR VEHICLES § 115 (1911)).

55. Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 64 N.W. 29, 32 (Mich. 1895) ("While the exercise of any
arbitrary power may seem harsh, still we are of the opinion that [it] is not so unreasonable as
to require the courts to declare it void.").
56. Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882).
57. Id. at 579; cf 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012) (reserving the right of Congress to alter,
amend, or repeal any provision of the Social Security Act).
58. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 41 N.E. 579, 581 (Ohio 1895).
59. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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allowances, and privileges are gratuities. They involve no agreement of
parties; and the grant of them creates no vested right. The benefits
conferred by gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time at the
discretion of Congress."" The Court was not treading on new ground with
this statement. In fact, the Court's statement was based upon the holdings
of United States v. Teller,62 Frisbie v. United States, 3 and United States v.
Cook."r All of these cases were decided by the Supreme Court and had
similar holdings.6 ' This was the state of property law prior to Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal.66
B. ConstitutionalProperty
The issue addressed by this Comment not only deals with how property
has traditionally been understood but further addresses how the Supreme
Court has handled property under the protections afforded by the
Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how the Supreme Court
has interpreted property in the context of the Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."6 ' This language suggests a limitation placed on the federal
government, while the Fourteenth Amendment, with similar language,
places the limitation on state governments. Therefore, before claimants
60. Id. at 577.
61. Id.
62. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1883) ("No pensioner has a vested legal right
to his pension.").
63. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 166 (1895) ("Pensions are the bounties of the
government, which congress has the right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall at its
discretion.").
64. United States v. Cook, 257 U.S. 523, 527 (1922) ("Congress, in shaping the form of
its bounty, may impose conditions and limitations on its acquisition and enjoyment. . .
65. See supra notes 62-64.
66. NOYES, supra note 32, at 350-412 (addressing the state of the law in 1936).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V. A nearly identical provision can also be found in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporated this language against the states. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
68. While the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a provision requiring just
compensation for the taking of private property, the Supreme Court has held that the takings
clause was also incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897). In this case, the City of Chicago
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can challenge government action, they must demonstrate an adversely
affected property right. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,6" the
Supreme Court required that "procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property."o In that case, David Roth was hired
under a one-year contract as a non-tenure professor for Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh." When Roth's contract expired, the University
decided not to renew the contract. 72 Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh
did not provide Roth with a reason for the non-renewal nor did it give Roth
an opportunity to contest the non-renewal." Accordingly, Roth brought
suit claiming a violation of his due process rights.7 ' The Court ruled in favor
of the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh by finding that Roth had neither
a property nor a liberty interest in his possible renewal, and therefore due
process protections were inapplicable.
The Roth Court took the view that property rights "are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 6
Building upon this rule in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation," the
Court understood this phrase to point them to the common law. The
Court continued to trace the incorporation of the English common law by
condemned the railroad's property and used the property to expand the roadway while
giving the railroad a mere dollar. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court has relied on natural law
concepts to find that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the takings clause against the
states and their political subdivisions. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
POWERS AND LIBERTIES 455 (3d ed. 2009).
69. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
70. Id. at 569.
71. Id. at 566.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 568.
74. Id. at 568-69.
75. Id. at 579.

76. Id. at 577.
77. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
78. Id. at 165 (beginning the analysis by stating, "The rule ... has been established under
English common law since at least the mid-1700s."). One legal scholar noted that even the
terms used by the Court gave extra weight to those sources that "had a long 'historical
pedigree.'" Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of ConstitutionalProperty,86 VA. L. REV. 885,
897 (2000) (citing Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165-68).
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the states." In this case, the Court used the common law as the avenue
through which the meaning of constitutional property should be defined.80
The clearest definition of constitutional property comes from College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid PostsecondaryEducation Expense Board."
In that case, the Court dealt with the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act82
("TRCA") and the Lanham Act." Because Congress enacted TRCA to
"prevent state deprivations" of property rights "without due process,"" the
Court needed to examine the nature of constitutional property." The Court
found that "[tihe hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to
exclude others. That is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property."'8 6 The Court held that
the petitioner's claim was flawed because the purported property interest
lacked the hallmark of protected property-the right to exclude others."
"[T]he bottom line is that the Court has now endorsed, unequivocally and
in a majority opinion, a federal definition of constitutional property."" This
is the current state of constitutional property. One scholar, however, notes
that the Court's ruling in College Savings Bank raises some perplexing
questions about its future application."
79. Phillips,524 U.S. at 165.
80. Merrill, supra note 78, at 898. The word choice in Phillips "intimates that perhaps
long-established common law rules are central to the identification of 'true' property
interests...." Id.
81. Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
82. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992).
Aside from changing a few clerical errors of the Lanham Act, the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act mainly abrogates the sovereign immunity of the states in lawsuits brought
under the Lanham Act. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 668-69.
83. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2012). "The Lanham Act confers standing
on 'any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged' by
misrepresentations in commercial advertising or promotion." Healthport Corp. v. Tanita
Corp. of Am., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1177 (2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012)).
84. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 673 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
87. Id.
88. Merrill, supra note 78, at 911.
89. Id. at 912.
The Court's disposition of the constitutional property issue in College Savings
Bank raises a number of perplexing questions. As in Eastern Enterprises,Justice
Scalia made no effort to reconcile the articulation of a federal definition of
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C. The Rise of Social Security
In 1935, Congress enacted the Social Security Act ("Act") "to provide for
the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age
benefits ... ."" These benefits primarily took the form of direct government
welfare payments to eligible individuals.9' Created on the advice and
recommendation of President Roosevelt's Committee on Economic
Security ("CES"), 92 the Act appropriates funds to the states and the federal
government, which use the funds to help needy individuals like the elderly,
the disabled, and their dependents." Furthermore, the Act established the
Social Security Administration, which administers the Act.94 On January 15,
1935, the CES issued a report outlining a compulsory system of
contributory annuities.95 The compulsory contributions were to be collected
through a tax placed on both the employee and the employer.96 The Act
compelled employers to pay the entire tax-paying half the tax from their
general funds and the other half by withholding a portion of their
employees' paychecks ("withholdings").97 The withholdings help create "a
constitutional property... that property rights are created and their
dimensions defined by independent sources such as state law. We are left
wondering whether the oversight was simply inadvertent, whether the Court
has abandoned the older approach, or whether it envisions some reconciliation
but has not troubled to tell us what it is.
Id. This skepticism is well taken considering that the Court previously stated that "[t]he
hallmark of property... is an individual entitlement grounded in state law...." Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
90. Legislative History: Social Security Act of 1935, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/35act.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
91. ALLEN W. SMITH, THE LOOTING OF SOCIAL SECURITY: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS
DRAINING AMERICA'S RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 31 (2004).
92. DEWITT ET AL., supra note 14, at 50 (providing a copy of Executive Order No. 6757,
which created the Committee of Economic Security and tasked it with the examination of
individual economic security).
93. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
94. Id. § 901.
95. See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY (1935), which says, "It is only through a compulsory, contributory system of oldage annuities that the burden upon future generations of the support of the aged can be
lightened." Id. at 29.
96. Specifically, "The compulsory contributions are to be collected through a tax on pay
rolls and wages, to be divided equally between the employers and employees." Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1002 (Supp. 11 1936) (providing for the deduction of the tax from an
individual's wages).
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self-respecting method through which workers make their own provision
for old age."" A statement from President Roosevelt, however, indicates
that he had less noble intentions."
The Supreme Court quickly certified the constitutionality of the Act in
two landmark decisions.'o The first decision, written by Justice Cardozo,
upheld the constitutionality of the tax upon employers.'o' In the second
decision, the Supreme Court found constitutional the withholdings taken
from an employee's paycheck.'02 These decisions solidified the
constitutionality of the Act, and by 1940, individuals began to receive
benefits.'03 Ida Fuller, the first recipient of Social Security benefits, paid into
the system for five years and then proceeded to collect benefits for the next
thirty-five years."
1. Financial Problems of Social Security
Fast-forwarding to the 1970s, Social Security faced its first serious
crisis-a likely shortfall of revenue to support beneficiaries over the next
seventy-five years.' Specifically, Social Security's "trust fund reserves fell
from 125 percent to 75 percent of annual payout."o' Faced with this
looming crisis, Congress worked to save the program and to augment its
deficiencies.' 7 Ultimately, this was to no avail as current figures indicate a
forty-six billion dollar deficit and project exhaustion of reserves by 2036.0
98. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 95, at 33.

99. "We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal,
moral, and political right to collect their pensions.... With those taxes in there, no damn
politician can ever scrap my social security program." Social Security: A Primer, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE 14 n.4 (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/32xx/doc3213/entirereport.pdf.
100. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937).
101. Charles C. StewardMach. Co., 301 U.S. at 577-98.
102. See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639-47.

103. Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever Scrap It: The Constitutional
Protectionof Social Security Benefits, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 865, 879 (2004).
104. Id. at 881.
105.

MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICY MAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 381(1979).

106. DEWITT ET AL., supra note 14, at 285.

107. Hawes, supra note 103, at 883. Specifically, Congress attempted to correct the
problems by creating a new formula for benefit calculation-one that would model the most
successful pension plans at that time. See NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL

SECURITY: FROM FDR's VISION To BUSH'S GAMBLE 219-23 (2005). Further, Congress increased

the maximum taxable wage base and raised the payroll tax. Id. Interestingly, Congress was
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2. Benefits Classification Problems of Social Security
These 1970s deficits raised the question about an individual's potential
rights in his Social Security benefits. Indeed, Congress proclaimed, "'Social
Security is not a handout; it is not charity; it is not relief. It is an earned
right based upon the contributions and earnings of the individual. As an
earned right, the individual is eligible to receive his benefit in dignity and
self-respect."'o9 The individual contributions, coupled with this type of
language, made Social Security seem almost akin to an individual
retirement account or pension plan.
These funds were collected as taxes for use in a welfare program. Justice
Cardozo confirmed that the contributions are simply a tax." 0 In both of the
cases that tested the constitutionality of the mandated contributions, Justice
Cardozo reasoned that Congress was merely exercising its power to tax."'
The Court said, "The tax, which is described in the statute as an excise, is
laid with uniformity throughout the United States as a duty, an impost, or
an excise upon the relation of employment."ll 2 Despite Congress speaking
in terms of "contributions," the Act was written in terms of taxation.'13
Therefore, claiming a property interest in Social Security would appear as
illogical as claiming a property interest in the Pentagon merely because one
dutifully pays his taxes.

aware that these actions would be insufficient to cure the Social Security deficit but adopted
these changes regardless. Id.
108. Actuarial Publications:A Summary of the 2011 Annual Social Security and Medicare
Trust Fund Reports, SOCIAL SECUlITY ONLINE, 1-2, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/
OACT/TRSUM/trl 1summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,2012).
109. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 623 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting 102
CONG. REC. 15110 (1956)).
110. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 635 (1937) (consistently referring to the
contributions as a tax).
111. Id.; Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578 (1937).
112. Id.
113. Compare REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 95, at 29
("In order to reduce the pension costs and also to more adequately provide for the needs of
those not yet old but who will become old in time, we recommend a contributory annuity
system...."), with Helvering, 301 U.S. at 635 ("[The Social Security Act] lays two different
types of tax, an 'income tax on employees,' and 'an excise tax on employers.'").
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a. Flemming v. Nestor
Regardless of the dictates of logic, the question came before the Court.
The Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor,"' the first landmark case on the
issue, held that the recipient had an interest in the continued receipt of
benefits."' In its holding, however, the Court stated that Social Security
benefits cannot be considered "accrued property rights.""'
But each worker's benefits, though flowing from the
contributions he made to the national economy while actively
employed, are not dependent on the degree to which he was
called upon to support the system by taxation....
It is hardly profitable to engage in conceptualizations
regarding 'earned rights' and 'gratuities." "
Having stated that Social Security benefits are neither an accrued property
right nor a gratuity, the Court concluded that there was, nonetheless, some
protectable interest that a beneficiary could possess."' This interest was
sufficient to afford the protection of the Due Process Clause, but "a
noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program" was insufficient to
stop Congress's alteration of benefits."' Flemming confirmed the idea that
one's Social Security taxes afford him some form of interest in future receipt
of those benefits.120 The Court, however, left unclear what type of interest
vested-contract, property, or liberty.
b. Goldberg v. Kelly
The Court in Goldberg v. Kellyl 21 expanded the interest that one could
have in his welfare benefits. 2 2 The Court held that welfare benefits were the

114. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
115. Id. at 611.
116. Id. at 608; see also Elmer F. Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37
OR. L.REv. 299, 358 (1958) (concluding that Social Security benefits could not be considered
anything but gratuities). The Supreme Court specifically overruled the district court's
contrary finding below. Flemming,363 U.S. at 608.
117. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 609-10.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 611.
120. Id.
121. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
122. Id. at 261-62.
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entitlement of those eligible to receive theml2 3 and noted that "[i]t may be
realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a
'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of
rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of
property." 2 4 In so holding, the Court adopted the rationale of Charles A.
Reich expressed in his influential work The New Property, which contends
that property includes anything upon which a man relies for his daily
needs.'25 The Court also held that the extent of procedural due processand arguably the extent of the right-is determined by balancing the
government's interest against the potential for grievous loss by the
recipient.12 6 In performing this balancing test, the Court stated that a
welfare recipient's interest is at its greatest when he has no other form of
provision.'27 This interest is augmented, the Court argued, by the
government's interest in providing an uninterrupted flow of welfare
benefits.'28 Therefore, the Court concluded that procedural due process
requires that a welfare recipient receive a pre-termination hearing.'29

123. Id.
124. Id. at 262 n.8.
125. Id. The Court continued to quote Charles Reich:
'(s)ociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his
franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his
union membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and
stock options; all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the
most important of these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to
farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for television
stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education; social security
pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether private or public,
are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are
essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor
whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been
effectively enforced.'
Id. (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)).
126. Id. at 262-63.
127. Id. at 264.
128. Id. at 264-65. The Court cited to the Constitution, stating that welfare and Social
Security are a means to promote the general welfare, and therefore, the government's interest
ought to be consistent with the continued and uninterrupted dispensing of welfare money.
Id.
129. Id. at 266.
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With dismay, Justice Black dissented: "The Court.. . relies upon the
Fourteenth Amendment and in effect says that failure of the government to
pay a promised charitable instalment [sic] to an individual deprives that
individual of his own property, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.""o Apparently, eligibility to receive benefits
creates a property interest in a new kind of property.
c.

Atkins v. Parker

In Atkins v. Parker,"' the Court clarified the questions that were raised
by Goldberg.The Court held that "' [a] welfare recipient is not deprived of
due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. ... [T]he legislative
determination provides all the process that is due.""32 The Court, however,
took a firm stance that entitlements, such as Social Security, are indeed a
form of property."' Therefore, despite an individual having a continued
interest in the receipt of welfare benefits, Congress has the power to
increase, decrease, terminate, or define the duration and scope of the
entitlement.' This gives rise to the issue addressed in this Comment. It is
inconsistent to claim that one has a property interest in his welfare benefits
while simultaneously claiming that Congress possesses the unfettered right
to extinguish that interest at any moment. Further, the Supreme Court has
used inaccurate terminology, wanting to avoid the harsh reality that Social
Security benefits are merely a gratuity.
III. PROBLEM

With the rapidly increasing federal debt"' and the federal government's
credit downgrade,'36 Congress has been forced to look closely at its spending

130. Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
131. 472 U.S. 115 (1985).
132. Id. at 129-30 (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33
(1982)).
133. Id. at 128.
134. Id. at 129.
135. HistoricalDebt Outstanding- Annual 2000 - 2010, TREASURY DIRECT (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt /reports/pd/histdebt/histdebthisto5.htm. The Bureau of
Public Debt reports the current public debt amount as of August 2012 to be 16 trillion
dollars. Monthly Statements of the Public Debt of the United States, TREASURY DIREcT (Aug.
31, 2012), http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2012/opdsO82012.pdf
136. See Menzie D. Chinn & Jeffry A. Frieden, Op-Ed., The Downgradingof a DebtorNation,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9,2011, at A23; see also A NationalDebt of$14 Trillion? Try $211 Trillion, NPR
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habits.'37 As an article in the New York Times stated, "We lost the first decade
of the 21st century by squandering our wealth and borrowing as if there was
no tomorrow. We risk losing this decade to an incomplete recovery and
economic stagnation."' In the federal budget, no program exceeds the cost of
Social Security to the federal government.'3 9 Balancing the national budget
seems impossible without curbing some of the spending on Social Security.'4 0
To do this, Congress must have clarity on the ramifications of cutting the
Social Security budget. There exists a myth that Social Security is identical to a
trust fund run by the federal government.'4 ' This myth has caused confusion

(Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/06/139027615/a-national-debt-of-14-trillion-try211-trillion (discussing the 2011 credit downgrade from AAA to AA-plus); Egan-Jones
downgrades US debt rating to AA- from AA, Citing Fed's Plans to Stimulate Economy, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/egan-jonesdowngrades-us-debt-rating-to-aa--from-aa-citing-feds-plans-to-stimulate-economy/2012/09/
14/7b3131e4-feab-1 1el-98c6-ecOaOa93f8eb-story.html.
137. See Robert Pear, Obama Sees Need to Add $1.2 Trillion to Debt Cap, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2011, at Al5. "Representative Tom Reed, a Republican from upstate New
York... said, 'Dealing with this national debt is one of the primary reasons why I ran for
Congress-to stop the endless borrowing of Washington, D.C., on the backs of our children
and our grandchildren.'" Id.
138. Chinn & Frieden, supra note 136.
139. ScoTT BITTLE & JEAN JOHNSON, WHERE DOES THE MONEY Go? YOUR GUIDED TOUR TO

THE FEDERAL BUDGET CRISIS 82-87 (2008). "[F]or all [the federal government's] complexity,

for all its reach, the fact remains that if you gauge it by the federal budget, the main function
of the world's greatest superpower is. . . writing checks to retired people." Id. at 83. "It's no
wonder this is the biggest federal program. Nearly 49 million Americans were getting Social
Security benefits in 2006. And working Americans who aren't getting Social Security now are
paying taxes to support those who are." Id. at 86.
140. A NationalDebt of $14 Trillion? Try $211 Trillion,supra note 136.
We've got 78 million baby boomers who are poised to collect, in about 15 to 20
years, about $40,000 per person. Multiply 78 million by $40,000-you're
talking about more than $3 trillion a year just to give to a portion of the
population.... That's an enormous bill that's overhanging our heads, and
Congress isn't focused on it.... What you have to do is either immediately and
permanently raise taxes by about two-thirds, or immediately and permanently
cut every dollar of spending by 40 percent forever.
Id. (quoting Professor Laurence J.Kotlikoff).
141. See BITrLE & JOHNSON, supra note 139, at 86-87. Social Security is

a "pay-as-you-go" program. People in the work force now pay taxes to cover
the check your grandma gets every month....
There's only one problem with the Social Security trust fund. It
mainly exists on paper. Rather than let the surplus Social Security money sit
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about the power that Congress may exercise over Social Security benefit
levels. 14 2 The confusion has been introduced by the Court's treatment of Social
Security benefits as property for purposes of due process."' This leaves
Congress with the false impression that the Constitution protects Social
Security recipients from the reduction or severance of benefits.'"
Consequently, even if Congress considered the unpopular idea of reducing or
cutting Social Security benefits, courts' ambiguous interpretations would
inhibit Congress's ability to effectively deal with the pressing deficit spending.
Simply said, courts have left the impression that Congress may be obligated to
continue paying benefits. By classifying Social Security benefits as property,
courts have implied that serious constitutional limitations may be placed upon
the legislature when dealing with Social Security benefits. Therefore, to return
legislative freedom to Congress, it is necessary to consider whether Social
Security benefits should be considered a property interest for constitutional
purposes.
A. TraditionalApproach
Under traditional views, property is the right of possession that one gains
over the object of his labor."' This can be contrasted to a gift, which one
neither labors for nor can expect as a return on services rendered. A gift
becomes the property of the intended recipient upon acceptance of
delivery."' Upon acceptance of delivery by the intended recipient, a
in the bank, the government has been borrowing it for day-to-day
operations.
Id.
142. Id. at 85.
143. See supra Part II.C.2.
144. In support of this assertion are multiple inquiries made to the Congressional
Research Service on the matter. The following is a brief sampling of those requests. See
generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & THOMAS J. NICOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32822,
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT ISSUES
(2010) (addressing select legal issues regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as
Congress considers possible changes to the program); DAWN NUSCHLER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERv., RL 33544, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES AND LEGISLATION (2010)
(addressing Social Security reform ideas proposed by the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform); KATHLEEN ROMIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33514, SOCIAL
SECURITY: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE TRUST FUNDS RAN OUT? (2008) (addressing what
would happen if the Social Security trust funds became insolvent in 2041). This concern
appears to remain, regardless of the holding in Atkins. See supra Part II.C.2.c.

145. See LOCKE, supra note 21, at 317; see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 8.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (2003).
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property interest vests.17 Upon vesting, the law protects the interest of the
recipient.14 1 Of these legal protections, the most pertinent to this Comment
are found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for just
compensation upon the government's dispossession of an individual's
property and for due process of law before the government deprives an
individual of a property right. 9
As demonstrated by Pierson v. Post, the traditional view of property
requires one to exercise dominion and control over an object.5 For
example, in 1853, the Ohio Supreme Court articulated the concept this way:
Our right to the free use and enjoyment of things which are in
common, such as air, light, [and water] is valuable; and our right
to the free use of the public highways, and to many of the
privileges and advantages derived from the government, may be
valuable, and may be maintained by legal process. Yet none of
these things come within the denomination of property. Those
things which constitute the subject matter of private property,
are such as the owner may exercise exclusive dominion over, in
the use, enjoyment, and disposal of them, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land. It is a fundamental
principle, that, 'property, considered as an exclusive right to
things, contains not only a right to use those things, but a right to
dispose of them either by exchanging them for other things, or
by giving them away to any other person, without any valuable
consideration in return, or even of throwing them away, which is
usually called relinquishing them.'
It is said that capability of alienation or disposal either by
sale, devise or abandonment, is an essential incident to
property.' 5 '
Social Security benefits do not possess the characteristics of traditional
property. They are not freely transferable. A recipient does not exercise
dominion over the benefits; rather, the recipient depends on government

147. Jackson Cnty. v. DNR, 717 N.W.2d 713, 724 n.10 (Wis. 2006).
148. See Hooping v. Wood, 526 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (detailing the
requirements for an inter vivos gift).
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also id. at amend. V.
150. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
151. Exch. Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 8 (1853) (citations omitted).
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relinquishment of control over the benefits. Therefore, Social Security
benefits traditionally could not fit under the umbrella of property.'52
B. RelationalPropertyAlteration
The relational view of property, however, offers a bridge by which the
concept of property becomes less concerned about dominion over an object
and more concerned about the balancing of power and wealth. 5 3 The
relational property view thereby allows courts to make rulings in which they
consider how property might affect the balance of power."' Through this
understanding, the courts left their traditional, judicial method of looking
backwards in time to make rulings based on static facts.'"' Instead, the
courts can now look forward to the prudential concerns and the balancing
of power.'56 Therefore, the relational property view opens the door for
prudential concerns to influence judicial decisions.
C.
Supreme Court's Understanding
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court used prudential reasoning to
reach its conclusion and thereby departed from a traditional legal analysis
152. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
153. Cohen, supra note 42, at 14.
154. The Court took this idea to the extreme in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
when it voiced its sympathy for the views articulated by Charles Reich in his article New
Property. See discussion infra Part III.D.
155. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundationof Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L.
REv. 297,325-34 (2010).
An analysis of the distinction between judicial and legislative powers is often
focused on differences in two elements-one is the element of time, and the
other the element of applicability. The distinction based on the element of time
is described in an oft-quoted passage from Justice Holmes:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand,
looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new
rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power.
Id. at 328 (citing Prentis v. Ad. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)).
156. The action of legislating, which includes the adoption of a constitution, is
forward-looking or prospective in nature. The focus in the legislative process
is not upon determining what happened at some particular time in the past in
some discrete situation. The focus is on formulating rules best designed to
achieve some lawful object of government.
Id. at 329.
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of property rights.17 By departing from a traditional legal analysis, the
Court was able to suggest that Social Security benefits might be properly
considered property.'" The problem arises from the term "property" itself.
When the notions of possession and the mere expectation of future
possession are confused,'
property becomes a less definite concept.
Furthermore, property interests, when rightly understood, should not be
subject to the whim of the legislature. The Court has attempted to classify a
gratuity as a property interest and thereby created confusion in the law.160
While this development complements an entitlement mentality, it causes
confusion in the law by creating a quasi-property concept. Some authors
have referred to this property interest as the "New Property."'
157. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
158. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
159. This is the very premise of Charles Reich's article, The New Property. For Reich,
property is the protection of those sources from which we derive our daily sustenance.
Therefore, just like a doctor relies on his ability to practice medicine, so does the welfare
recipient rely upon his eligibility to receive Social Security. What makes this view most
problematic is that, rather than rewarding laborers by protecting the fruits of their labor, it
instead protects an individual's stagnation. Rather than incentivizing a system of forward
movement, Reich's system removes many of the incentives to productivity. The saying "less
is more," may not be far from the truth under the New Propertyview.
160. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius once commented on similar shifts in so-called
justice.
The delusion is as old as it is detestable with which many men, especially those
who by their wealth and power exercise the greatest influence, persuade
themselves... that justice and injustice are distinguished the one from the
other not by their own nature, but in some fashion merely by the opinion and
the custom of mankind. Those men therefore think that both the laws and the
semblance of equity were devised for the sole purpose of repressing the
dissensions and rebellions of those persons born in a subordinate position,
affirming meanwhile that they themselves, being placed in a high position,
ought to dispense all justice in accordance with their own good pleasure, and
that their pleasure ought to be bounded only by their own view of what is
expedient.
HUGO GROTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 1 (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph Van
Deman Magoffin trans., 1916). But see William J.Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passionand
"the Progressof the Law," 10 CARDOZo L. REv.3 (1988).
I want to suggest... [that Goldberg] can be seen as an expression of the
importance of passion in governmental conduct, in the sense of attention to the
concrete human realities at stake. From this perspective, Goldbergcan be seen
as injecting passion into a system whose abstract rationality had led it astray.
Id. at 19-20.
161. Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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D. New Property
Charles Reich begins his article, The New Property, with this
foundational supposition: "Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in
revenue and power, and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services,
contracts, franchises, and licenses. Government has always had this
function."l6 2 Furthermore, because many individuals rely on these
government provisions in place of their savings, their wealth can be said to
reside in the government's largess.' 63 This largess "is helping to create a new
society."'" This new society is experiencing a change in its forms of wealth,
just as land and private property once signified an individual's wealth.' 6s
Because Reich understands property to be a relationship between an
individual and his source of wealth, Reich characterizes property to include
an individual's relationship to his government benefits. 66
This Comment seeks to clarify the misconception that Social Security
benefit payments may be classified as property rights. While this fact may
not be intuitive to all, it remains true that the traditional view of the
protection of private property stems from the protection of labor. Hence,
the common law protected those who exercised dominion over an object
because of the assumption that one who had dominion had exerted labor to
achieve that dominion. 6 1 Social Security benefits, on the other hand, are
more properly classified as gratuities.'6 These gratuities flow from the
generosity of the American government and of the American people. They
are not the property of the recipient but rather the property of the
benevolent giver. Despite the myth sold to the American public, Social
Security is not a pension plan. It is a welfare program created by a previous
Congress that future Congresses are not bound to continue. Therein lies the

162. Id. This statement seems highly contradictory to the preamble of the Constitution.
Redistribution of wealth does not establish justice, tranquility, or defense. Neither does it
"promote the general Welfare" (which is promoted by the establishment of justice,
tranquility, and defense) or "secure the Blessings of Liberty." U.S. CONST. pmbl.
163. Reich, supra note 161, at 733. Reich contends that the forms of government-created
wealth include welfare benefits, jobs, occupational licenses, franchises, contracts, subsidies,
public resources and services. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 738.
166. Id. at 739.
167. See supra Part II.A.
168. See supra Part II.C.
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problem: the courts have further perpetuated this myth by treating Social
Security benefits as property for purposes of due process.
IV. PROBLEM
A. Property and Propriety
Private property, it has been said, is propriety and an ethical
institution.169 "Private property has been defended on grounds of justice,
freedom, progress, peace and happiness."o Indeed, private property is so
central to the American spirit that there can be little surprise that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments both provide broad protections from the
deprivation of private property by the government."' Property, however,
can be a difficult idea to define. The common law relied upon the concept
of possession to define property.'72
Possession accurately embodied the rationale behind the protection of
private property and provided a simple standard for the law. To first
acquire property, presumably one had to exert some form of labor to gain
possession over an object and thereby gain a defensible right in the object.
Specifically, Blackstone understood this right to be "that sole despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world"" to the exclusion of another man. To describe property in any
other way is to distort the reality that the term property stems from the
Latin proprius,meaning "one's own."174
While there is some utility in considering how possession impacts one
individual's relationship to another individual, that relationship is purely
secondary to the owner's relationship to the object. When person X claims
ownership in his home, the primary idea communicated is that the home is
his possession. Given such possession, it is also true that person Y does not
possess the home. But to fully appreciate this corollary, one must first
understand the primary assertion, i.e., that the home belongs to X. If our
primary focus is on Y, it is impossible to deduce who has actual ownership
of the home.

169.

GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 9

(1963).

170. Id.
171. U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV.
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
173. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *2.
174. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 907 (3d ed. 2005).
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Despite the strange nature of thinking of ownership in reverse, that is
precisely what the relational view of property does. It makes a subtle
mockery of disciplined thinking by making primary assumptions secondary
and secondary corollaries primary. Under the relational property view,
ownership requires the courts to balance individuals' interests in an
object.' For example, in Pierson v. Post,"' the court used the traditional
notions of possession to determine ownership of the fox.' If the court had
taken a relational property approach, it would have had to weigh the
competing interests of Pierson and Post. Post's interest would include the
effort he exerted in the hunt, the accolades of having killed the fox, and
possibly a future financial interest in the sale of the pelt. Pierson's interest
would be characterized by his efforts exerted in actually killing the fox and
by his current control of the fox's carcass. The court would proceed to give
values to the differing interests and ownership that would be granted to the
individual with the greatest cumulative interest in the object. Unlike the
actual case, the determinative factor would not be possession. This
relational approach cheapens the rule of law because a balancing test is
inherently subjective.
B. Innovative Deviations
The deviation from a traditional analysis served to open the minds of
legal thinkers to new and innovative ways of viewing property. The most
critical of these new views can be found in Charles Reich's article The New
Property."'Reich's article calls for a definition of property that encompasses
many forms of wealth.' Reich argues that the government has become an
instrument for the redistribution of wealth.so The government, through
taxes and regulations, limits some people while granting others certain
privileges."' For example, through the imposition of regulations and the
collection of taxes, the doctor is permitted to practice medicine, the lawyer

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See supra Part II.A.3.
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
Id. at 177.
Reich, supra note 163.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 733-38.
Id.
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is allowed to practice law, and the poor are entitled to collect their food
stamps.'82
Consequently, there seems to be an injustice in telling an individual, who
depends entirely upon the government, that he has no defensible right in
the continued receipt of daily sustenance. Yet, under the law, that is the
answer that the courts must give. The New Property, however, offers a path
that gives defensible rights to the individual purely on the basis of his
degree of dependence.' From this point, the connection between the
relational property view and The New Property can be clearly seen. Both
views involve a balancing of the interests between two parties. According to
the The New Property, the most relevant concern is the individual's degree
of dependency, while under the relational property view the most relevant
concern is the balancing of power.
C. The Court's Take
All of this discussion of property would be irrelevant if it were not for the
protections afforded by the Constitution. The Constitution protects private
citizens from the dispossession of property by the government in both the
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments."' Consequently, the Supreme
Court's definition of property is of utmost importance to any claim of
property rights in an individual's Social Security benefits.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has declared in College Savings Bank'
that the "hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others.""' Nevertheless, there certainly are strong grounds to question
whether this actually is an accurate understanding of property in the
constitutional sense."' This is because previously, in Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co.,' the Court stated that the "hallmark of property.. is an
individual entitlement grounded in state law."' In Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 the
Court hinted at the adoption of Charles Reich's The New Propertyby stating
182.
183.
184.
185.
(1999).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
See Brennan, supranote 160, at 22.
U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV.
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
Id. at 673 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
See Merrill, supra note 78, at 912.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,430 (1982).
Id.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
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that it "may be [more] realistic to regard welfare entitlements as more like
'property' .... [TI he existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights
that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property."' 9 '
While the College Savings Bank definition certainly has the earmarks of a
more traditional definition of property, the Goldberg case was dealing with
welfare benefits, and College Savings Bank did not address government
gratuities.192 Therefore, there is reasonable uncertainty as to what the
Supreme Court might do if faced with a scenario more akin to that
presented in Goldberg.
D. The Enigma
To properly analyze the issue, a deeper discussion of the characteristics
of Social Security is warranted. What makes Social Security such an enigma
in the law is the way in which it combines traditional investment aspects
with government mandates. A simple passage taken from a January 15,
1935, CES report demonstrates the mixture of investment terms with the
government mandates that Congress envisioned.
It is only through a compulsory, contributory system of old-age
annuitiesthat the burden upon future generations of the support
of the aged can be lightened. With an increasing number and
even more rapidly increasing percentage of the aged, the cost of
supporting old persons will be a heavy load on future generations
regardless of any legislation that may be enacted.

. .

. In order to

reduce the pension costs and also to more adequately provide for
the needs of those not yet old but who will become old in time,
we recommend a contributory annuity system on a compulsory
basis, to be conducted by the federal government.193
Congress further indicated that the contributions were to be collected
through a tax placed on payrolls and wages.' 4 Therefore, despite speaking
in terms of annuities, the program was structured like a welfare program.
The only difference between a normal welfare program and Social Security

191. Id. at 262 n.8.
192. Compare Goldberg,397 U.S. at 254 (adopting a broad definition of property), with
Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 666 (1999)
(adopting a traditional notation of property).
193. DEWITT ET AL., supra note 14, at 53 (emphasis added).
194. Id.
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is the demarcation of a special income tax going specifically to Social
Security.
There are a plethora of reasons why Social Security had to be structured
in this manner, the most important being the limitations that the
Constitution places on the federal government. The Constitution does not
authorize the government to require compulsory contributions to an
investment program; however, it does provide for the power to tax.' 95
Therefore, to even contemplate this program, Congress was limited to tax
power.' 96 Unlike a normal investment plan, Congress was under no
contractual obligation to continue the payment of benefits.' While many
might agree that there is an ethical duty upon the government to provide
benefits to those who contributed to the system, there cannot be a legal duty
unless a beneficiary can show a property interest in the continued receipt of
his Social Security benefits.
If a Social Security beneficiary has a property interest in the continued
receipt of his benefits, then the Constitution affords him some level of due
process before his benefits can be terminated, reduced, or altered.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has taken some strong steps to find a
property interest in Social Security benefits, an interest that protects
individual recipients but continues to allow Congress the freedom to
perform its legislative role.' To do this, however, the Court has butchered
the traditional concept of property by forcing it into a forward-looking
balancing test-one that weighs the interests of the government against
those of the individual recipients.

195. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.").
196. Such legislative entrenchment cannot be done. See United States v. Winstar, 518
U.S. 839,872 (1996).
Blackstone stated the centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind
the legislative authority of its successors:
"Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments
bind not.... Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is
always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon
earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could
bind the present parliament."
Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90 (1765)).
197. See supra Part II.A.4.
198. See Brennan, supra note 160, at 19-22.
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When dealing specifically with entitlements, like Social Security, the
Court addressed the property rights issue in the 1960 case Flemming v.
Nestor.'"9 There the Court developed a quasi-property interest, which it
stated was not a true property interest.200 The Court stated instead that the
quasi-property interest was a "non-contractual benefit" sufficient to invoke
due process yet insufficient to hinder Congress's ability to statutorily alter
the program.2 0 ' Thus, the Court struck a balance between the protection of
individual recipients' interests and the government's interest-while only
slightly altering traditional notions of property.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, however, the Court went further. In Goldberg, the
Court completely disregarded Nestor's refusal to extend the label of
202
property interests to entitlements. Instead, the Court concluded that it
may be more useful to consider a recipient's interest as a property interest,
given the realities of today's government largess.2 03 Once again, this allowed
the Court to extend the protections of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment but at the expense of a completely redefined
conception of property. Interestingly, the Court's stance overstated the
strength of the property interest that the Court was actually permitting a
beneficiary to have.
In Atkins v. Parker, the Court affirmed, in spite of Goldberg's strong
language, that Congress still had the authority to alter or amend entitlement
programs.204 But despite the holding of Atkins, the Court has never
retracted its opinion in Goldberg,which obscures the law as to the definition
of property rights. This imprecision has been noticed by members of
Congress, who have requested multiple briefs from the Congressional
Research Service dealing with the problem.205
Given the impending budgetary crisis, large programs like Social Security
may have to be altered, amended, or even terminated. The courts, not
helping the situation, have introduced uncertainty into the legislative
process by forcing Congress to look closely at the minutiae of the Court's
decisions to determine whether Social Security benefits may even be
199. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
200. Id. at 611.
201. Id. at 608-11.
202. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970).
203. Id. at 262 n.8.
204. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985).
205. See supra note 144 and the authorities cited therein. This concern appears to remain,
regardless of the holding in Atkins.
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decreased constitutionally. Property, as a concept that was once readily
understandable, has been recast as any interest the Court deems worthy of
protection from Congress. This uncertainty handicaps our legislative body
in its ability to deal effectively with the budgetary problems it faces.
Considering how unpopular it would be to reduce Social Security
benefits, 2 06 any congressman who would propose such a plan would need to
expend large amounts of political capital to ensure the plan's passage. It is
doubtful that any congressman would even begin to suggest such a plan
when he believes his efforts might be ruled unconstitutional by the courts.
Therefore, because the courts have drastically expanded the definition of
property, they have inadvertently hammered a nail into the coffin of
America's financial future. Yet, the situation is not without hope because
the solution is simple in nature.
E. The Simple Solution
The solution lies in abrogating the greatly expanded view of property. A
return to the traditional view of property may seem archaic and unworkable
in this modern system of dynamic regulations and interests. Nevertheless,
only through clear definitions based on concrete principles can the law even
begin to address these modern complexities. The current definition inhibits
the creation of solutions to the problems facing Social Security because
legislatures are forced to venture guesses at what whimsical definitions the
Court might draw.
The operation of a welfare state is a new experiment for our Nation. For
this reason, among others, I feel that new experiments in carrying out a
welfare program should not be frozen into our constitutional structure.
They should be left, as are other legislative determinations, to the Congress
and the legislatures that the people elect to make our laws.207
It has been said that bad facts make bad law. Twisting the definition of
property to protect the American public from a raw deal is not justice.
Neither can it be considered the role of the courts. By distorting the proper
understanding of property, the courts have perverted justice and have
endorsed a myth in avoidance of a harsh reality-a reality in which
American workers hold no property rights in Social Security benefits. A
206. The unpopular nature of this idea stems largely from the fact that many Americans
depend upon Social Security for at least a supplement to their retirement. See Research,
Statistics & Policy Analysis, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/index.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2012) (providing current statistics on Social Security beneficiaries).
207. Goldberg,397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).
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court's job is not to provide charity but to ensure justice. Let the executive
branch administrate and the legislative branch govern, but let the courts
deal in justice by perfectly applying the law-not to satisfy their own
inward passions but rather to satisfy the law.
V. CONCLUSION

This Comment has identified a fundamental change in our society's
understanding of property rights. The change was not brought about by an
informed legislative process but was the result of judicial compassion. Such
compassion has been made the arbiter of property rights. The problems
created are detrimental to the legislative process and concepts of selfgovernance. The purpose of this Comment is to call for a narrower
definition of property, a definition this author believes is necessary to
address the complexities of modern life. In the same way that scientific
progression often occurs through increased precision, so too do precise
legal definitions allow for new, advanced, and efficient legal structures to
develop.

